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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

:e

I

ETHEL M. GIBBONS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

OREM CITY CORPORATION,
and GARY SCOTT CRAWFORD,
Defendants and Respondents.

12

Case No.
12476

RESPO·NDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE

11

11

11

This is an action against Orem City Corporation and
its employee. Plaintiff claims property damage and personal injury which allegedly resulted from a collision between plaintiff's automobile and a vehicle owned by defendant Orem City and driven by its employee, defendant
Gary Scott Crawford.
Plaintiff alleges that the driver of defendant's vehicle was negligent in his operation of said vehicle. Defendant denied its driver's negligence, and alleged that
plaintiff's negligence proximately contributed to her
damage and injuries, barring her recovery.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court for Utah County granted defend.
I
ants' motion for summary judgment and judgment was j
entered in favor of defendants upon the grounds that ,
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, '
which was a proximate contributing cause of her dam.
age.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents seek an affirmation of the trial
court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 7, 1968 at approximately 12:50 p.m.
plaintiff, Ethel M. Gibbons, was driving her automobile
south on State Street in Orem, Utah, with May Soren
son, deceased, as her passenger. As plaintiff's automo·
bile approached the intersection of State Street and State
Road 52 she drove into the left turn lane and stopped, in
compliance with the semaphore light which was red for
south bound traffic. When the semaphore light she was
facing changed to green, plaintiff attempted to make a left
turn into the path of the north bound traffic facing her,
which traffic included the Orem City truck driven by the
defendant, Gary Scott Crawford. Plaintiff failed to see de·
fencfnt's truck and another vehicle driven by witness
Boyd Erickson, both of which were north bound, and her i
automobile and defendant Orem City's truck collided in I
said intersection.
1
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

IN FAILING TO KEEP A PROPER LOOK-

OUT.

Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she did not
see defendant Orem City's truck prior to the collison. Her
restmony is quoted as follows:

Q.

You were stopped waiting for the light to
change from red to green?

A.

Yes.

Q.

The question is were there any other cars on
the opposite side of the intersection headed
in a northerly direction or opposite from your
car? Do you follow me?

A.

There was no one in my lane of traffic, I guess
I could say.

Q.

I didn't make myself clear. You were stopped,

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you were waiting for the light to change
from red to green. Now were there any other
cars on the opposite side of the intersection
also waiting for the light to change that you
remember?

A.

I do not remember. I knew that there was no
one obstructing my lane of traffic.

your car would be facing south waiting to
make a left hand turn to go east, were you
not?

3

Q.
A.

You intended to make a left hand turn to
go east, did you not?
Yes.

Q.
A.

Up towards Heber City?
Yes.

Q.

After the light changed you started to make
your left hand turn, is that right?
Yes.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Did you see any vehicles come ino the inter·
section going north which might interfere
with your path or the path your car was
going?
I did not.
Did you see the truck which struck your car
before the collision occurred?
I did not.

Then your first notice that an accident was
happening was when a truck hit your car, is
that right?
Struck my car.
You didn't see the truck before it struck your
car?
No, indeed. If you will excuse me I had made
that turn many,many times before.

(Plaintiff's deposition, page 7, beginning with line
7 and continuing to and including line 15, page 8). (Em·
phasis added).
During questioning by her attorney plaintiff sim·
ilarly testified as follows:
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Q.

You were headed in a south and easterly direction to make a left turn, is that right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Where did you look in the course of making
that turn, or did you have your eyes closed?

A.

No, I didn't have my eyes closed, never when
I was driving a car.

Q.

Go ahead, tell us where you looked?

A.

I looked in the direction which I was going,
east.

Q.

Did you look in any other direction?

A.

And I looked in the direction to the right
of me to see that there was no one coming
that would be in front of me.

Q.

Would that be to the west?

A.

No, that would be watching for the traffic
coming from the south, if I remember my directions right.

Q.

Did you see any coming from the south?

A.

I never saw anyone. They told me that is
where the truck came from, but I did not see
him. I did not see him.

(Plaintiff's deposition beginning with line 27, page
18 and continuing to and including line 15, page 19).
rnmphasis added).
In her own affidavit which is dated subsequent to
her deposition, plaintiff reiterates that she did not see
the approaching traffic:
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. . . I never saw the truck that hit me. My
blinker signal was on for my left turn. I had
looked to the south to see if any traffic was coming
from the south. I saw no traffic coming in mi·
direction and proceeded with my turn. . . . (R.
141).
It should be noted that plaintiff herself never stated
in her deposition or affidavit that her view was obstructed
in any way. Instead she testified that she did not see de·
fendant's vehicle until impact and that she saw no traffic
coming in her direction.
The only suggestion that plaintiff's view of defend·
ant's vehicle was in some way obstructed is made by plaintiff's attorney in their brief, on page six. There they
affirmatively state, without supporting evidence, that
the position of Mr. Boyd Erickson's car obscured defendant's dump truck and that plaintiff could not see the truck
because of the Erickson car.
Later, on page seven of plaintiff's brief, it is claimed
that the skid marks of defendant's truck shown in the
photographs show that the defendant driver would have
been able to see "out over a passenger car such as the
Erickson vehicle." On one page plaintiff says that her
view was probably obstructed. However, on the following page she claims that the defendant truck driver could
have seen over that very obstruction. It would seem fair
to conclude that if the defendant driver could see the
plaintiff, then the plaintiff could also see the defendant.
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The law has been clearly established in this state
that a motorist who makes a left hand turn in the face of
oncoming traffic, on a busy highway, must exercise reasonable care to be aware of the position of approaching
vehicles, their speeds, and must appraise the situation as
to whether said turn can be made safely. Budge# vs. Yeates,
122 Utah 518, 252 P2d 220; Hickok vs. Skinner, 113 Utah
l, 190 P2d 514; French vs. Utah Oil Refinery Co., 117
Utah 406, 216 P2d 1002; Cederloff vs. Whited, 110 Utah
45, 169 P2d 777; Gren vs. Norton, 117 Utah 121, 213
P2d 356.
The case of Smith vs. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400
P2d 570 ( 1965) is clearly distinguishable on its facts from
the case at bar. In that case the plaintiff testified that he
pulled into the left hand turn lane, signalled his turn,
that as he was stopped he noticed cars in the northbound
turn lane, that when the light turned green and the vehicles started to turn west, he checked and "everything
was clear as far as he could see", that he was almost across
the intersection when he saw the head lights of the defndant' s truck "bearing down on him." The evidence
showed the defendant Gallegos had been northbound on
the inside lane, and as he approached the intersection,
pulled into the outside lane around other northbound
cars at an accelerated rate of speed.
In this instance plaintiff on a clear day, saw no vehicles, not even the Erickson car which was forced to
make an abrupt stop to avoid a collision.
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The case of Hardman vs. Thurman, 121 Utah 143,
239 P2d 215, cited by plaintiff also involved a different
fact situation. In that case plaintiff was making a left
hand turn to go east through the intersection of State
Street and 21st South Street in Salt Lake City. When the
light turned green she stopped to permit northbound
traffic to proceed through the intersection. There was a
truck making a left hand turn from the inside lane, another vehicle in the middle northbound lane had stopped
to permit plaintiff to make the turn, under those circumstances she was clearly justified in assuming defendant's
truck would also stop and yield her the right of way.
Contra to the plaintiff in the case at bar, she made a care·
ful appraisal of the situation and did not continue with
her left hand turn until it became apparent northbound
traffic had yielded her the right of way.
From plaintiff's own testimony the evidence is con·
elusive that she did not see nor make any attempt to see
approaching traffic which was there to be seen.
B. FAILING TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY
IN VIOLATION OF 41-6-73 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.

The Utah statute controlling right of way where one
driver is making a left turn reads as follows:
The driver of a vehicle within an intersection in·
tending to turn to the left shall yield the right .of
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction which is within the intersection or so
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard,
during the time when such driver is moving with·
in the intersection.
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The affidavits of witness Boyd Erickson and defendant Gary Scott Crawford establish that their vehicles were
each so close as to constitute an immediate hazard to plaintiff making a left turn through the intersection. In defendant Gary Scott Crawford's affidavit he states that he
first observed plaintiff's automobile as it moved into his
lane of traffic making a left turn. (R. 57). He estimates
the distance separating the two vehicles at 70 to 75 feet.
(R. 57). He detected no evasive action by plaintiff. (R.
57). He further states that plaintiff and her passenger
appeared to be talking to each other just prior to the
collision. (R. 57).
The affidavit of witness Boyd Erickson (R. 61) states
that he was north bound on State Street and 800 North
(State Road 52) when he witnessed the collision between
plaintiff's and defendant's vehicles. As he approached the
red semaphore he braked almost to a stop. When he was
almost stopped, the semaphore changed from red to green
for northbound traffic. He then proceeded into the intersection. He testified as follows:

i

I

When I was almost completely stopped, the semaphore changed to green in my direction and I
therefore proceeded into the intersection when a
Ford automobile coming from the north and located in the turn lane provided for south bound
traffic made a sudden left turn immediately in
front of me. The driver apparently intended to
drive east through the intersection onto 8th North.
When the driver commenced the turn, I was already in the intersection and I had to make an
abrupt stop to avoid hitting this automobile even
though I had almost stopped at the inersection.
Just at the time that I was stopped to avert making
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conact with the Ford automobile, I heard brakes
screeching to my right and rear. I had no idea of
what caused this noise because I was observing
the Ford automobile in front of me and did not
observe the source of the screeching brakes until
a dump truck skidded past me on my right and
cdlided with the Ford automobit! in the intersec·
tion. The dump truck made contact with the right
side of the Ford vehicle and moved the Ford some
distance to the north. The dump truck drove past
me in the lane immediately to my right. I do not
recall detecting any indications made by the driver
of the Ford vehicle that a left turn was intended.
As I approached the particular intersection the
Ford vehicle was stopped in the far left lane of the
southbound traffic. Only when the light turned
green did that vehicle commence to make the
abrupt left turn into the intersection. The driver
of the Ford vehicle undertook no evasive action
which was apparent to me prior to the impact.
(R. 61-62).
Plaintiff's testimony does not contradict these state·
ments since she admitted that she did not see defendant's
truck prior to the impact. With reference to the vehicle
driven by witness Boyd Erickson, plaintiff was asked in
her deposition if there were any other cars on the oppo·
ie side of the intersection waiting to proceed north. Plain·
tiff answered: "I do not remember". (p. 7 of plaintiff's
deposition). Plaintiff further stated that she looked for
traffic coming from the south but "I never saw anyone".
(p. 19 of plaintiff's deposition). As referred to above,
plaintiff also looked to the south but saw no traffic com·
ing in her direction. (R. 141).
Without contradiction by plaintiff's own testimonr
or evidence, the testimony of defendant Gary Scott Craw·
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ford and the witness Boyd Erickson establishes that defendant's vehicle was close enough to the intersection to
constitute an immediate hazard, and the Erickson vehicle
was already within the intersection when plaintiff made
her left turn. In attempting to turn left plaintiff violated
Section 41-6-73, Utah Code Annotated (1953) and was
therefore negligent as a matter of law. Skerl vs. Willow
Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 474, 69 P2d 502 ( 1937).

POINT II.
THE GRANTING OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHERE THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT.
Relying on the case of Singleton vs. Alexander, 19
Utah 2d 292, 431 P2d 126 ( 1967), Plaintiff's brief argues
that Summary Judgment in negligence cases should rarely
be granted. Language is quoted from that decision suggesting that Summary Judgment is more frequently granted in contract cases than in negligence cases. Nonetheless,
Singleton vs. Alexander, supra, agrees that a motion for
Summary Judgnfut is proper where there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, whether the case concerns
contracts, negligence or any other type of legal problem.
In a discussion of Summary Judgments under Rule
56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the court has said:
The primary purpose of the Summary Judgment
procedure is to pierce the allegations of the pleadings, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, although an issue may be raised by the
pleadings, and that the moving party is 1::ntitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to provide a
substitute for the regular trial of cases in which
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there are disputed issues of fact upon which the
outcome of the litigation depends, and it should
be invoked with- caution to the end that litigants may be afforded a trial where there exists
between them a bona fide dispute of material fact.
However, where the moving party's evidentiary
material is in itself sufficient and the opposing
party fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when
he is presumably in a position to do so, the courts
should be justified in concluding that no genuine
issue of fact is present, nor would one be present
at tral.
Upon a motion for Summary Judgment, the courts
ought to recognize, as a minimum, that the oppos·
ing party produce some evidentiary matter in con·
tradiction of the movant's case or specify in an
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so.

Dupler vs. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P2d 624
(1960).
In the case of Henry vs. W ashiki Club, Inc., 11 Utah
2d 138, 355 P2d 973 0960), the defendant's motion for
Summbary Judgment was granted by the trial court and
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Plaintiff complained of
injuries sustained when he fell down a dark stairway.
In affirming the Summary Judgment the court said:

We recognize the validity of the plaintiff's argu·
ment that doubts should be resolved in favor of
permitting one who has a grievance to present his
claim to a court or jury, and that a Summary Judg·
ment, which deprives him of that privilege,
should be granted without reluctance. However,
it does have a useful and salutary purpose. When
the evidence as contended by the plaintiff, and
every reasonable inference that fairly could be
drawn therefrom, are considered in the light most
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favorable to him, and it nevertheless appears that
he could establish no right of recovery, the motion
should be granted to save the time, trouble and
expense involved in a trial.
Although the courts are careful to preserve litigants'
rights to have their claims ultimately decided by a trial,
Summary Judgment may properly decide those claims in
which the evidence shows there are no genuine issues as
to a material fact. Here, the plaintiff admits that she
failed to observe the approaching vehicle which collided
with her car. She likewise concedes that she did not
observe any northbound traffic, even the northbound vehicle which stopped to avoid hitting her car.
CONCLUSION
The evidence and every reasonable inference which
can fairly be drawn therefrom shows that plaintiff was
negligent as a matter of law, which was a proximate
cause of her damage, and the judgment of the Trial Judge
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
REX J. HANSON
and ROBERT W. MILLER
of Hanson, Baldwin, Brandt
& Wadsworth
Attorneys for Respondents.
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